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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
Boulevard Rule Overextended?
Eastern Contractors v. State1
A ten-wheel truck was proceeding on Bell Grove Road
in an easterly direction toward a dirt road which inter-
sected it, while a payscraper (a giant piece of earthmoving
equipment) moved noisily north on the dirt road. The
vehicles collided at the intersection which was regulated
by a traffic signal and the impact threw the truck into the
decedent, a special police officer directing traffic. Dece-
dent's widow and children brought a "wrongful death
action" against the driver of the truck, the driver of the
payscraper and their respective employers, while the truck
driver's employer brought an action against the payscraper
driver's employer. These actions were consolidated for
trial. The insurer of the owner of the payscraper paid
$10,000 to decedent's widow and children and entered as
plaintiff's subrogee in the wrongful death action. Each
driver claimed that the green light was in his favor, but
there was evidence in the case from an eye-witness motor-
ist which supported the contention of the truck driver, and
in addition showed that the truck had been waved on by
the decedent. The driver of the payscraper ignored the
signal of decedent when he entered the intersection. The
trial judge charged the jury that the truck, even if it ap-
proached a green light, was required to cross the inter-
section heeding traffic conditions, and that failure to do so
would require a verdict against it. The Court of Appeals,
dividing 4-3, held that the instruction was improper and
remanded the case for a new trial.
The majority held the trial court's instruction to be in
error as no reference was made to proximate cause, thus,
in effect, directing a verdict against the favored driver. The
situation presented was analogized to the boulevard cases
because both the traffic signal and the boulevard cases in-
volve a peremptory duty to stop at an intersection. If the
truck driver approached a green light, he might assume
that the payscraper would stop, as the truck driver's testi-
mony, if believed,:would indicate that the payscraper was
very far from the intersection when he first became aware
of its presence. Not until an instant before the collision
when it was too late to stop did the truck driver realize
the imminent danger, thus indicating no negligence on the
part of the truck driver that would be a proximate cause of
the fatal injury.
' 225 Md. 112, 169 A. 2d 430 (1961).
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The minority, speaking through Chief Judge Brune, felt
that the majority was sanctioning a rule which told "the
driver of a car just getting the green light... that he may
wear blinders and ear muffs and go right ahead."2 The
minority reasoned that the boulevard rule was not ap-
plicable to situations presented by automatic signal devices
(traffic lights) because that rule was designed to expedite
traffic on a favored highway, while in traffic light situations
there is no one "favored" highway - rather an alternately
favored highway. The real test for the minority was what
a reasonable man would have done in the truck driver's
position, and the minority said it was incomprehensible
that "a reasonable, prudent man could fail to see or hear
a huge, roaring piece of earthmoving equipment approach-
ing the intersection that he is about to enter, or how, if he
did see or hear it, . . . [could sensibly assume it would
stop] .",
The boulevard rule has developed mainly from cases
construing 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 , § 233(a):
"The driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop
at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield
the right of way to other vehicles approaching on said
through highway."
and Section 233 (b), containing a similar provision relating
to intersections controlled by a stop sign.
As those sections have been construed, the failure of the
unfavored driver4 to stop and yield the right of way to
traffic on the favored street is negligence.5 The favored
driver may assume that the unfavored driver will perform
his duty by stopping.' Because the favored driver may
make this assumption he need not slow down at inter-
sections.7 However, the favored driver's right to proceed
is not an absolute one and there seems to be a certain point
2 Id., 136.
8 Ibid.
' The term "unfavored driver" usually refers to the driver who has the
duty to stop, while the "favored driver" is one on the through street who
has no such duty.
5Rinehart v. Risling, 180 Md. 668, 26 A. 2d 411 (1942); Mudge v.
Fabrizio, 179 Md. 517, 20 A. 2d 172 (1941) ; Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md.
116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939), noted in 4 Md. L. Rev. 207 (1940).
a Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A. 2d 570 (1956), noted in
17 Md. L. Rev. 68 (1957); Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md.
354, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956); Sonnenburg v. Monumental Tours, 198 Md.
227, 234, 81 A. 2d 617 (1951); Greenfeld v. Hook, supra, n. 5; Carlin v.
Worthington, 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937).
'Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, ibid; Baltimore Transit Co. v.
O'Donovan, 197 Md. 274, 78 A. 2d 647 (1951); Belle Isle Cab Co. v.
Pruitt, 187 Md. 174, 49 A. 2d 573 (1946).
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where he may no longer assume that the unfavored driver
will stop.8 For instance, if the favored driver had specific
knowledge or should have known that the unfavored driver
would not stop, his absolute right may be revoked under
the last clear chance doctrine.' Yet the presumption that
the unfavored driver will stop is a weighty one. The court
in Belle Isle Cab v. Pruitt1° stated that "in determining due
care, the assumption that the unfavored driver will stop
and yield the right of way is an important factor" and
found the favored driver non-negligent even though he was
warned by a sign labeling the intersection as "dangerous"
and containing the word "slow."
Usually evidence that the favored driver is speeding or
straddling the center line of the road or even driving on the
wrong side of the road is not strong enough to be deemed
the proximate cause of the accident and therefore will not
make the favored driver contributorily negligent." How-
ever, in a few circumstances it has been held for the jury
to decide whether the favored driver's excessive speed was
negligent. 2
The likely import of the principal case is to make the
boulevard rule applicable to intersections controlled by
8 The boulevard rule, according to some cases, is the statutory appli-
cation of the "stop, look, and listen" rule in conjunction with railroad
crossings; Pegelow v. Johnson, 177 Md. 345, 9 A. 2d 645 (1939) ; Greenfeld
v. Hook, supra, n. 5; Carlin v. Worthington, 8upra, n. 6. This rule
stated:
"It is negligence per se for any person to attempt to cross tracks
of a railroad without first looking and listening for approaching
trains; and, if the track in both directions is not fully in view in
the immediate approach to that point of intersection of the roads,
due care would require that the party wishing to cross the railroad
track should stop, look and listen before attempting to cross." Carlin
v. Worthington, supra, n. 6, p. 509, quoting Philadelphia, W.B.R.
Co. v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 149, 161, 7 A. 105 (1886).
In general though, cases where the railroad has been held non-negligent
were instances in which the railroad had given adequate warning to the
public at the crossroads in the form of a whistle, bells, or lights. "Even
though it gives warning, a railroad still has an obligation to avoid
injuring others, if it learns of their danger in time to do so." Supra,
n. 1, 132.
9Fowler v. DeFontes, 211 Md. 568, 128 A. 2d 395 (1957) (dictum);
Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, supra, n. 7 (dictum); Greenfeld v. Hook,
supra, n. 5.
10 Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 181 Md. 174, 180, 49 A. 2d 573 (1946).
"Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, supra, n. 6; Ness v. Males, 201
Md. 235, 93 A. 2d 541 (1953).
2In Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 339, 170 A. 2d 753 (1961), the favored
driver was proceeding at 30 miles per hour in a 25 mile zone. The
unfavored driver of a tractor-trailer drove out of the side street con-
trolled by 'a stop sign and was struck by the favored driver. Since the
favored driver had a clear view of the intersection for three blocks
before he reached it, the court held the question of the favored driver's
contributory negligence one for the jury. See also Harper v. Higgs, 225
Md. 24, 34, 169 A. 2d 661 (1962).
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automatic signal devices. These intersections are governed
by statutes13 which deal specifically with traffic lights and
are separate and distinct from the section dealing with the
boulevard rule. 4
A driver faced with a green light can assume that no
one will unexpectedly drive across the intersection, but is
still "required to use due care and caution to see that
traffic in the intersection is such that he can proceed with
safety. He must regard and heed actual traffic conditions.
* . .If a motorist enters an intersection blindly, without
anticipating traffic in the intersection, he is guilty of negli-
gence, even though he has the green light or other signal
to proceed."' 5
Although there have been several cases involving inter-
sections controlled by traffic lights, they do not seem to
have relied on the boulevard rule as a basis for their result.
Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.," involved a traffic light sit-
uation, but the driver facing the red light was already in
the intersection before the light turned red. Thus the
driver under Section 193(b) was lawfully in the inter-
section. The Court of Appeals held that the favored driver
cannot proceed blindly through an intersection in disregard
of those who may be lawfully in the intersection but left
open the question of what the rule would be when the un-
favored driver is unlawfully in the intersection, 7 (which
is the fact situation in the instant case). In Sun Cab Co. v.
Faulkner,8 the plaintiff was a passenger in defendant's
speeding taxicab which was travelling through an inter-
section having a "green" traffic light and collided there
with another vehicle which had gone through the "red"
light. The Court found that the defendant's negligence
was not the proximate cause of the accident as the defend-
ant had no reason to know of the vehicle's presence until
an instant before the collision. The Court spoke solely in
terms of proximate cause - that the injury must be the
natural and proximate result of the negligence - and in
no way mentioned the boulevard rule or suggested that
the boulevard principle would be applicable to a traffic
light situation. Gudelsky v. Boone 9 involved a traffic light
situation where both drivers were on the favored street
'86 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66Y., § 193(a), (b) and (c).146 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66Y., § 233.
11 3 M.L.E. 375-376, Automobiles, § 127; See also Valench v. Belle Isle
Cab Co., 196 Md. 118, 75 A. 2d 97 (1950).
196 Md. 118, 75 A. 2d 97 (1950), noted, 13 Md. L. Rev. 350 (1953).
1113 Md. L. Rev. 350, 357 (1953).
18163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194 (1932). This case represented a situation
analogous to the majority's finding in the instant case.19180 Md. 265, 23 A. 2d 694 (1942).
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approaching each other and one driver made a left turn in
front of the other. The Court again put its ruling in terms
of proximate cause and contributory negligence distinctly
stating that the "boulevard law, ... does not apply when
traffic at [an] intersection is controlled by traffic signals. ' ' "U
Legum v. Hough,2 cited by the majority in the instant
case,22 involved an uncontrolled intersection so its state-
ment that "a . . . stringent rule, comparable to the 'stop,
look and listen' rule, has been applied in cases where traffic
is controlled by lights" is merely dictum. Even so, as sup-
port for the statement, the Court in Legum used the Faulk-
ner and the Gudelsky opinions as authority.
The majority relied also on Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Cialkow-
ski23 to support its contention. However, in Sun Cab the
plaintiff was a pedestrian crossing an intersection in the
crosswalk and facing a green light. The defendant taxicab
came through a red light and hit the plaintiff. The Court
said that the conflicting evidence was sufficient to let the
jury decide the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The majority, therefore, was not compelled by prior
decisions to extend the boulevard rule to a traffic light
situation, but appears to have done so by analogy for what
it might have considered policy reasons.24 A prudent driver
on a favored boulevard could quite reasonably expect the
same performance of a driver faced with a stop sign as a
driver approaching a "red" traffic signal. This, however,
goes somewhat beyond the policy behind the boulevard rule
which was stated in Blinder v. Monoghan25 as follows:
"The manifest purpose of the statute is to facilitate and
expedite the movement of traffic within and between
congested centers of population by setting aside se-
lected highways as through roads over which traffic
may move without interruption or delay. To accom-
plish that it dispenses with the right of way rules ap-
plicable to highways generally, and gives the right of
way to all traffic on such highways and, as a necessary
police measure for the protection of the travelling
public, it provides that no one shall enter a highway
without first stopping, and that having stopped, the
operator of any vehicle approaching such a highway
Id., 268.
192 Md. 1, 63 A. 2d 316 (1949).
Supra, n. 1, 123.
- 217 Md. 253, 142 A. 2d 587 (1958).
See Harper v. Higgs, supra, n. 12, 33.
171 Md. 77, 83-84, 188 A. 31 (1936). (Court refers to the instant
case as having "equated a road on which the light was green to a
boulevard.")
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shall yield the right of way to 'all vehicles approaching'
thereon."
As the dissent in the instant case points out, at an inter-
section controlled by traffic lights, there is no highway se-
lected as a through road since the favored and unfavored
highways alternate every few seconds with the changes in
the traffic signal. Thus, the driver approaching a green
light should expect that at any instant it may turn "amber"
and then "red." If he is speeding, or not paying attention
to the light, it is possible that he will not be able to stop in
time if the light does change to "red." He will then be un-
lawfully in the intersection as defined by § 193(c). It may
be argued that a rule which condones the right of the
favored driver to speed when faced with a "green" light
may lead the favored driver into a hazardous or untenable
position should the light suddenly change. This seems to
be what the minority feared would result from the
majority's approach."
BLAsHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, 27 states
that a favored driver at an intersection controlled by traffic
signals may assume an opposing driver will not enter the
intersection, and it is not negligence for the favored driver
The rights of favored and unfavored drivers in jurisdictions other than
Maryland at both "stop sign" and "traffic light" controlled intersections
is dealt with extensively in an annotation in 164 A.L.R. 8 (1946) and
extending for more than 300 pages. The ambiguities arising from the
relatively few Maryland decisions on the subject 'are amplified into
confusion when the numerous cases from other jurisdictions are examined
together.
Although generalizations are difficult, the annotation states on page 251
that the decisions involving a favored driver at "stop sign" controlled inter-
sections tend to operate "to prevent a holding that he was guilty of
negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law .. ", but
qualifies this by stating on page 257 that "[u]nder the facts appearing
in some cases it has, of course, been recognized that a vehicle driver
may be found guilty of negligence or contributory negligence although
he approached the intersection where the accident occurred along a street
or highway protected by stop signs." Also the fact that a driver is faced
with a green light "has been seized upon by courts as operating, or at
least tending, to free him as a matter of law of the charge of negligence
or contributory negligence." (page 242). This statement is later modified
on page 244 with the condition that "[u]nder the facts appearing in
many cases, of course, it has been recognized that a pedestrian or vehicle
driver was guilty of negligence or contributory negligence under cir-
cumstances shown, or, at least, was guilty of conduct from which the
trier of the facts could find him negligent or contributorily negligent,
despite the fact that he approached or entered an intersection with a
favorable traffic signal."
It would seem therefore, that the conclusion to be drawn, if any, would
be to examine the facts of each situation carefully, compare them with
previous decisions in the jurisdiction and to consider the facts with
applicable local statutes controlling intersections in mind.
22 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (1951) § 1028, pp.
304-307.
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to assume this, yet after acquiring knowledge to the con-
trary he must exercise the care of an ordinary prudent
person. In Eastern Contractors, the truck driver testified
that he knew giant payscrapers crossed the intersection,
and that he heard one approaching as the decedent waved
him through but did not look. Perhaps a jury, even believ-
ing the testimony of the truck driver, might have found
that he had, or as a reasonably prudent driver should have,
"acquired knowledge to the contrary" in time to stop and
that as a reasonably prudent driver he would not have pro-
ceeded through the intersection.
While the majority and minority appear to be diametri-
cally opposed, and the minority objects to the seeming ex-
tension of the boulevard rule to the instant case, it is
doubtful if the applicability or non-applicability of the
boulevard rule fully explains the result and the dissent
therefrom. The divergence really seems to be one of inter-
pretation of the facts, and the extent to which the question
of how a reasonably prudent driver would have reacted
under all the circumstances. Perhaps under the boulevard
rule, or any other rule that does not impose absolute lia-
bility, the credence to be given to testimony and the ulti-
mate resolution of any disputed fact should be left to the
jury, under instructions which clearly and completely state
the law. However, the sharp division of the judges as to
the applicability of the boulevard rule to traffic light situ-
ations may suggest that where responsibility for injury is
so difficult to assess, a rule of comparative liability would
yield a fairer result and that legislative investigation of the
need for a rule of comparative negligence for appropriate
cases is called for.28
BERRYL A. SPEERT
The Admission Into Evidence Of Extra-Judicial
Confession Of Guilt Made By Third Parties
Brady v. State'
Brady and Boblit were each convicted of first degree
murder in separate trials for the killing of one Brooks in
the course of a robbery. At the trial of Boblit, the court
2See Comment, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed
Law Reform, 11 U. of Florida L. Rev. 135 (1958); Comment, Comparative
Negligence A Survey for Arkan8as Lawyer8, 10 Arkansas L. Rev. Bar Ass'n
Journal 54 (1956); Comment, Comparative Negligence, 51 Michigan L.
Rev. 465 (1953).
1226 Md. 422,174 A. 2d 167 (1961).
